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ARGUMENT 1

STANDARD OF REVIEW: CORRECTNESS-OF-ERROR AND
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ARE THE STANDARDS OF PETITIONER
REVIEW THAT SHOULD BE APPLIED IN THE PRESENT CASE.
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of discretion to the Board to interpret its rules and
regulations,1
As a general rule, an agency's interpretation of its
own regulation is entitled to judicial deference.

See Concerned

Parents of Stepchildren v. Mitchell , 645 P.2d 629, 633 (Utah
1982).

However, administrative regulations like the citing

criteria at issue in the present case cannot be ignored or
followed by the agency to suit its own purposes.

State, Etc. v.

Utah Merit System Counsel, 614 P.2d 1259, 1263 (Utah 1980).
In Morton, the Utah Supreme Court announced the
dispositive factor in determining the appropriate standard of
review to be whether the agency, by virtue of its experience or
expertise, was in a better position than the courts to give
effect to the regulatory objective to be achieved.

Morton

International, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d at 586.
As the Morton Court explained:
We do not defer to the (agency) when construing statutory
terms or when applying statutory terms to the facts unless
the construction of the statutory language or the
application of the law to the facts should be subject to the
(agency's) expertise gleaned from its accumulated practical,
first-hand experience with the subject matter.
Id. at 586-87.

USPCI appears to echo the argument presented by the Board
on this issue. It argues that the statutory directive
found in Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-105(3) to establish
criteria carries with it an implied discretion relating
to application of the criteria.
s \dw;j\6956
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The specific regulatory language at issue in the
present case states:
The application shall also contain evidence that
emergency response plans have been coordinated with local
and regional response personnel.
Utah Admin. R.315-3-23(c) (1) .
The regulation in question does not contain technical
terms for which the agency's expertise rather than the court's
would apply.

The language in question is no different than that

employed in numerous statutes, contracts and other writings that
courts deal with on a daily basis.

Therefore, even under the

Morton standard, this Court should apply the less differential
correction-of-error standard.

See also Savage Industries v. Utah

State Tax Commission, 811 P.2d 664, 668 (Utah 1991).
Once this Court determines the appropriate
interpretation of the regulatory language it must then determine
if substantial evidence exists to support the Board's ultimate
conclusions.

See First National Bank of Boston v. County Board

of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990).
ARGUMENT II
INTERPRETATION OF REGULATION: EVIDENCE OF COORDINATION
WITH NON-AFFILIATED LOCAL AS WELL AS REGIONAL EMERGENCY
RESPONSE PERSONNEL IS REQUIRED UNDER THE APPLICABLE
REGULATION.
Because of the limited quantity and nature of the
evidence presented to the Board on the issue of coordination of

s \dw3\6956
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emergency response plans, interpretation of R.315-3-23(c) (1)
becomes the determinative issue in this appeal.

The Board and

USPCI argue that the mandate of R.315-3-23(c)(1) (that emergency
response plans have been coordinated with local and regional
response personnel) was fulfilled in this case in one of two
ways.2

In the first instance, they argue that intracompany

coordination between the three USCPI* business locations in Tooele
County constituted adequate evidence of local coordination.
Secondarily, they argue that, based on the distance between the
site and the nearest municipality, local coordination was not
necessary.3

At page 21 of its brief, USPCI presents an argument that
the Board did not rely on evidence of prospective
agreements. Specifically, USPCI points to the testimony
of Cheryl Heying to support its argument. Ms. Heying was
questioned directly on the issue presently before this
Court.
She testified that the emergency response
assessment found in the contingency plan attachment
constituted evidence of compliance with R. 315-3-23 (c) (1) .
Index Part B. Doc. 55 (March 17, 1992 Hearing Transcript
at 514-515).
The Board's and USPCI's argument that no coordination was
required at the local level ignores the express
provisions of R.315-3-23(d). Subparagraph (d) provides
that exemptions from the criteria may be granted upon
application after an appropriate public comment period.
A request to dispense with the requirement of local
coordination would fall squarely within the reach of that
subparagraph.
Any interpretation of R.315-3-23 must
harmonize with rather than override that separate
provision.
s \dv}\6956
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Sierra Club has conceded that adequate evidence was
presented to the Board to support a finding that coordination
with regional response personnel had been completed prior to
August 14, 1990. That coordination was embodied in part in an
agreement between USPCI and Tooele County entitled "USCPI-Tooele
County Impact Mitigation Agreement (Index, Part B, Doc. 56,
Attachment B)".

This Agreement, which was entered into in 1988,

provides for the coordination of the county's emergency response
personnel.
In addition, the Impact Mitigation Agreement provides
that USPCI shall pay impact mitigation fees to Tooele County to
compensate the county for the cost of deploying its emergency
response personnel.
There can be no question that the payment of impact
mitigation fees is a critical component of the Impact Mitigation
Agreement.

The nature of the business engaged in by USPCI and

others who build, operate and maintain hazardous waste facilities
carries with it significant risk that the handling of the
hazardous materials will result in emergency situations that
threaten the safety and welfare of the populace.
Equally important is the risk that an area's populace
will be burdened with the extraordinary expense inherent in any
response to this type of emergency situation.

The arguments

presented by the Board and USPCI are addressed exclusively to the
s \dw]\6956
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former concern, to wit, the safety and welfare of the people in
Tooele County.
The Board and USPCI argue that the portion of the
application that states that personnel at the other USCPI
locations will be trained and available to respond in emergency
situations fulfills the requirement for coordination with local
personnel.
However, the existence of trained personnel, either at
the specific site or at other locations operated by an applicant,
does not address the adjacent municipalities' concerns about the
financial burden created by their inevitable response to
emergency situations caused by the operation of the facility.

No

one has argued, nor could they, that municipal response personnel
will not be involved in the overall emergency response.

In fact,

USPCI recognizes response personnel from local communities will
be involved when it states in its brief that emergency response
coordination shall result in contacts with Tooele County, Tooele
City, Grantsville City, the Utah Highway Patrol and appropriate
medical services.

(USPCI's Brief pp. 18-19).

When viewed in its entirety, R.315-3-23 establishes
specific criteria that must be met by an applicant in siting a
hazardous waste facility.

Subsection (b) of the rule prohibits

the siting of such a facility in certain, specific locations.
Subsection (b)(xiii) prohibits the location of a hazardous waste
s \dwj\6956
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facility within five miles of existing permanent dwellings,
residential areas, etc.
Subsection (c) of R.315-3-23 addresses emergency
response and transportation questions.
divided into three parts.

That subsection is

The first requires an assessment of

the availability and adequacy of emergency response services.
Such an assessment must be included in the plan approval
application.

Subsection (c)(1) also requires that the

application contain evidence that emergency response plans have
been coordinated with local and regional response personnel.
Subsection (c)(2) of R.315-3-23 requires the applicant
employ trained emergency response personnel that are capable of
responding to emergencies at the site and along transportation
routes within the state.

Obviously, USPCI's personnel at the

site and at USCPI-Grassy Mountain and USCPI-Lakepoint fulfill
that requirement.4
These requirements regarding the siting of a hazardous
waste facility implicitly recognize that such a facility shall

Subsection (c)(2) requires details of the proposed
emergency response capacity be given in the plan approval
application. The Board argues that the portions of the
application that contain a description of this capacity
also fulfill the requirements of subsection (c) (1) .
(Respondent's Brief pp. 14-15) . Coordination with local
emergency response personnel is a separate and distinct
requirement of the regulation which cannot be merged with
another distinct requirement, to wit, emergency response
personnel maintained by the applicant.
s \dwj\6956
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impact cities and counties adjacent to any potential location.
The Board's regulations present specific prohibitions against
locating a facility in certain defined areas.

In addition, the

siting criteria require an assessment of non-affiliated emergency
services relative to the proposed location and pre-application
coordination with non-affiliated local and regional emergency
response personnel.
The criteria found in R.315-3-23(c)(1) represent a
means by which municipalities and counties become participants in
the site selection process.5
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the broad powers
granted to counties and cities to provide for the health and
welfare of their citizens.
1116 (Utah 1980).

See State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d

As the majority opinion in Hutchinson stated:

The grant of general welfare power to counties is duplicated
by a similar grant to cities . . .
Id. at 1122.
Quoting a leading authority on municipal government the
majority of the Court in Hutchinson explained:
. . . courts uniformly regard the (welfare) clause as ample
authority for a reasonable exercise, in good faith, of broad

R.315-3-23 (c) expressly recognizes that Titles 10 and 17
of the Utah Code Annotated gives cities and counties
authority for local use planning and zoning and provides
that cities and counties may establish additional
requirements
for
the
siting
of
hazardous
waste
facilities.
s \dw3\6956

8

and various municipal activity to protect the health,
morals, peace and good order of the community to promote its
welfare in trade, commerce, industry and manufacturing, and
to carry out every appropriate object contemplated in the
creation of the municipal corporation.
Id. at 1125.
The requirement of pre-application coordination with
non-affiliated local response personnel provides municipalities
that will be impacted by the site selection an avenue for active
participation in the siting process. As pre-application
participants the municipalities can effect their broad purpose
and protect their citizenry from the physical and financial
burdens imposed by the risks inherent in applicant's business.
All parties recognize that Tooele County was allowed to
participate in this process and emerged from that participation
with an agreement that provided direct monetary compensation from
USPCI in the form of impact mitigation fees.

Both the Board and

USPCI ask this Court to interpret R.315-3-23(c)(1) by eliminating
the necessity of similar coordination between the applicant and
proximate municipalities.6

Both the Board and USPCI argue the fact that Grantsville
and Tooele are not next to the proposed site provides
justification for the Board interpreting the term "local"
out of R. 315-3-23 (c) (1) .
Grantsville is located
approximately 37 miles from the proposed location and
Tooele is approximately 47 miles away. USCPI-Lakepoint
which is presented by both parties as evidencing local
coordination is located 50 miles from the site.
Depending on the access route used for any particular
shipment of hazardous waste, either Grantsville or Tooele
s \dvr)\6956
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By eliminating the requirement of pre-application
coordination, the Board would allow the applicant to impose
emergency response plans upon the surrounding municipal
governments as its whim.

Exclusion of this requirement from the

siting criteria would leave the municipalities at the mercy of
the applicant in negotiating response plans after the facility is
built and operating.

Thus, while Tooele County would receive

mitigation fees from USPCI neither Tooele City nor Grantsville
City would receive any compensation for expenses incurred in
local response to an emergency situation.

This would result in

the municipal tax base being burdened with extraordinary expenses
and no way to recoup them from the applicant.
Such a result was not the intent behind the specific
siting criteria in question and should not be the policy of the
Board in enforcing that criteria.
Under any standard of review this Court should find
prejudicial error in the Board's failure to require evidence of

could be the closest location for emergency response
personnel.
Similarly, the lack of an adjacent
municipality renders either of those cities as the most
likely candidate for an emergency medical destination and
the provider of other services necessitated by an
emergency situation.
s \dw:\6956
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pre-application coordination with non-affiliated local emergency
response personnel.7
ARGUMENT III
APPROPRIATE REMEDY: A JUDICIAL DETERMINATION THAT THE
APPLICATION WAS NOT COMPLETE ON AUGUST 14, 1990 IS THE
APPROPRIATE REMEDY UNDER THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE.
The Board and USPCI argue that if this Court finds that
the application did not comply with the criteria found in R.3153-23 (c) (1), then it should remand the matter back to the Board to
determine whether the application was complete on August 14,
1990.
Utah Admin. R.315-3-23(e) states:
The plan approval application shall not be considered
complete until the applicant demonstrates compliance with
the criteria given herein.
Following the adjudicative hearings the Board expressly
concluded as a matter of law that the CIF Operation Plan
application and the CIF Plan Approval complied with the siting
criteria of R.315-3-23(c)(1), (2) and (3), and the application
was complete on August 14, 1990 with respect to those
requirements.

1

s \dw3\6956

(Index, Part B, Doc 61, Conclusions of Law % 8).

USPCI argues that the criteria in question does not
require a written agreement or other writing. However,
in his testimony before the Board, the executive
secretary stated that the criteria in question requires
written evidence of pre-application coordination in the
form of some written agreement. (Index, Part B, Doc 55,
March 17, 1992 Hearing Transcript at 441, lines 3-5) .
11

If the criteria found in R.315-3-23(c)(1) were not met,
the application could not be complete on August 14, 1990 and the
Board's conclusion to the contrary would be erroneous. R.315-323(c)(1) requires evidence that emergency response plans have
been coordinated at the local and regional level before the
application is filed.
It is obvious that a requirement for pre-application
coordination cannot be complied with after the application has
been filed or after it has been determined to be complete.

The

Board and USPCI argue that the application process recognizes
that materials and information will be supplemented throughout
the process.

However, something cannot be supplemented if it was

not in existence in the first place.
The complete lack of any evidence of coordination of
emergency response plans with unaffiliated local emergency
response personnel creates an insurmountable gap in the
application that renders it incomplete.
Based on the record before it, this Court can determine
whether the application was or was not complete on August 14,
1990.

If this Court adopts the interpretation of R.315-3-

23(c)(1) advanced by the Board and USPCI
complete.

the application was

If the Court adopts the interpretation advanced by the

Sierra Club, the application was not complete as a matter of law
and the matter should be remanded with appropriate instructions.
s \dvrj\6956
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CONCLUSION
The arguments advanced by both the Board and USPCI
recognize that municipalities near the proposed hazardous waste
facility site shall be involved in emergency response situations.
Notwithstanding this recognition, the Board and USPCI ask this
Court to endorse an interpretation of R.315-3-23(c)(1) which
would eliminate the necessity of USPCI submitting evidence that
emergency response plans had been coordinated with emergency
response personnel at the municipal level.
The Board and USPCI acknowledge that no such
coordination took place, but ask this Court to uphold the
erroneous agency action and USPCI's non-compliance with the
applicable siting criteria by interpreting the specific
requirement out of the regulation.
The evidence before the Board and this Court
establishes a complete lack of emergency response coordination
between USPCI and any independent third parties at the local
level.

Without evidence of the required local coordination the

application could not be complete and the Board's factual and
legal conclusions to the contrary constitute reversible error.
The Sierra Club respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the Board's error, declare the application incomplete and
remand the matter to the Board with direction to re-open the
application process.
s \dw]\6956
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DATED this 5th day of March, 1993.

Daniel W. Jackson
Attorney for Sierra Club, Utah
Chapter, Petitioner
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